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ON NUCLEAR ISSUES

POLAND

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Poland is the biggest Central and Eastern European (CEE) EU and NATO member, signatory to multiple international disarmament and non-proliferation treaties, as well as a participant in important political initiatives, such as PSI and NPDI. Warsaw's main area of activity includes discussions on non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs), both within NATO and as part of NPT. Poland is currently expanding its anti-missile and cruise-missile capabilities.

NUCLEAR

Poland does not possess, produce or host nuclear weapons on its territory.¹ Warsaw is party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and has an Additional

Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The country is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee, as well as a participating state in the Wassenaar Arrangement.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, DISARMAMENT AND POSITION REGARDING NATO'S NUCLEAR POLICY

For nearly a decade after becoming a NATO member in 1999, Poland did not seem to attach special attention to the issue of nuclear deterrence as a component of the Allied strategy. Warsaw's restraint was dictated largely by the lack of a substantial debate on nuclear matters within NATO and by the provisions of the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act, in which

the Alliance declared that it had “no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members.” As this declaration limited Poland's participation in any nuclear mission to support and planning functions, Poland seemed neither interested nor predisposed to start a meaningful discussion regarding nuclear weapons.²

¹ However, under a secret 1967 Polish–Soviet agreement, Poland hosted Soviet tactical nuclear warheads at three storage sites from the early 1970s until as late as 1990. In case of a conflict with NATO, the operational plans assumed that around 178 warheads would be transferred to the Polish air force and tactical missile units, which would perform nuclear strikes against targets in Western Europe. Additionally, Poland also hosted at least one separate storage site with nuclear bombs assigned to Soviet non-strategic aircraft. See P. Piotrowski, T. Pompowski, “Polska miała arsenał broni nuklearnej” [Poland had a nuclear arsenal], *Dziennik*, 12 October 2007, wiadomosci.dziennik.pl; P. Piotrowski, “Organizacja i dyslokacja Armii Czerwonej/Radzieckiej” [Organisation and dislocation of Red/Soviet Army], in: K. Rokicki, S. Stępień (eds.), *W objęciach Wielkiego Brata. Sowieci w Polsce 1944–1993* [In Big Brother's arms—the Soviets in Poland 1944–1993], Warszawa 2009.

² Ł. Kulesa, “The New NATO Member States,” in: P. Foradori (ed.), *Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Euro-Atlantic Security*, Routledge, Abington, 2013, pp. 143–144.

Poland was, however, obliged to actively engage in discussions on the matter due to the intense debate that preceded the adoption of the 2010 NATO New Strategic Concept and the 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review's (DDPR) unclassified findings. The problems of nuclear deterrence and disarmament became especially important after U.S. President Barack Obama announced his long-term initiative for global elimination of nuclear weapons and after some Western-European Allies, such as Germany, began to call for the possibly unilateral withdrawal of American NSNWs from Europe.³

From the beginning of NATO's internal discourse, Poland took a "middle road" approach towards nuclear deterrence and nuclear disarmament. Although Warsaw officially endorsed gradual cuts in nuclear arsenals and did not object to partial modifications of NATO's declaratory policy, it did not support radical changes with respect to the Alliance's nuclear posture.

On one hand, Poland, along with other NATO members, agreed at the 2010 Lisbon Summit to work towards creating conditions for a nuclear weapons-free world. Moreover,

Poland reportedly supported the idea to reflect U.S. and UK negative security assurances adopted in 2010 as part of NATO's nuclear policy.⁴ The Polish foreign minister at the time also vocally welcomed the New START Treaty between Russia and United States.⁵ On the other hand, according to studies based on interviews with Polish and regional officials and experts conducted before the adoption of the 2012 DDPR, Poland, together with other CEE Allies, advocated maintaining the provisions, which would uphold the deterrence role of not only the U.S., British and French strategic nuclear forces but also the U.S. NSNWs based in Europe.⁶

Nonetheless, Warsaw did not entirely oppose cuts in the NSNW arsenal or its complete withdrawal, although Polish officials emphasised that such moves would be only possible provided that Russia took reciprocal steps.⁷ According to non-papers co-authored by Poland and distributed to NATO members, potential cuts could be facilitated by the previous establishment of transparency and confidence-building, such as sharing information on the numbers, locations, operational status and command arrangements of NSNWs, as

³*Ibidem*, pp. 143–148.

⁴Still, Poland, as with other CEE states, did not take active part in the discussion, which was led by the U.S., UK, France and Germany.

⁵R. Sikorski, "Why the West needs a New Start," *The Guardian*, 20 November 2010, www.theguardian.com.

⁶J. Durkalec, "NATO Defence and Deterrence Posture: Central and Eastern European Perspectives," *PISM Policy Paper*, no. 29, May 2012, pp. 2–3.

⁷C. Bild, R. Sikorski, "Next, the Tactical Nukes," *The New York Times*, 1 February 2010, www.nytimes.com; R. Sikorski, J.G. Store, "NATO, Russia and Tactical Nuclear Arms," *The New York Times*, 14 May 2012, www.nytimes.com.

well as declarations about a storage site's security status and voluntary notifications on transfers of NSNWs. The non-papers also recommended a review of the role played by NSNWs in the military doctrines of NATO, Russia and the U.S., as well as mutual visits by military officials, common seminars and exchanges on the conditions for a gradual reduction of NSNWs.⁸

Additionally, Poland participated actively in the works of the NATO Special Advisory and Consultative Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Committee, tasked with the preparation of CSBM-related proposals regarding NSNWs. Polish authorities have also supported think-tank activity in that area, e.g., by supporting the "2013 Warsaw Workshop: Prospects for Information-Sharing and Confidence-Building on Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe."⁹

Overall, Warsaw values NSNWs as an instrument of deterrence and Allied assurance, but it is willing to relinquish those weapons in return for the elimination of Russian NSNWs, many of which could be deployed in proximity to Polish borders and which pose a potential threat to Poland's security.

Russia's aggression against Ukraine, including its annexation of Crimea, and the U.S. accusations of Russia's violation of the INF Treaty make any progress on TCBMs or reductions of NSNWs even more difficult than before, leading to more direct Polish statements emphasizing the value of NATO's nuclear deterrence policy. In response to U.S. information about Russia's violation of the INF Treaty, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in July 2014 that Russia's alleged non-compliance with the treaty reaffirmed "the importance of NATO's nuclear deterrence policy, which was adopted along with the Strategic Concept at the Alliance's Lisbon summit in 2010."¹⁰

In recent years, Polish experts' work on NATO's nuclear policy has focused on its political and security value and arms control dimension, with a particular emphasis on U.S. nuclear weapons based in Europe.

In general, the Polish expert community has been sceptical of any unilateral NATO steps, especially to a withdrawal of U.S. B-61 bombs from Europe.¹¹ According to some of these experts, the unilateral removal of NSNWs would weaken the transatlantic link and undermine the credibility of the American

⁸ "Non-paper on including tactical nuclear weapons in Europe in a broader nuclear disarmament and arms control process," www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Sikkerhetspol/nonpaper_nuclear.pdf; "Non-paper submitted by Poland, Norway, Germany and the Netherlands, about increasing transparency and confidence with regard to tactical nuclear weapons in Europe," Berlin, Germany, 14 April 2011.

⁹ See: "The Warsaw Workshop: Prospects for Information-Sharing and Confidence-Building on Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe," Polish Institute of International Affairs, 7 February 2013, www.pism.pl/en.

¹⁰ "MFA statement on information about Russia's non-compliance with the INF Treaty," Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 July 2014, www.msz.gov.pl/en.

¹¹ See, e.g.: J. Durkalec, "The US Non-Strategic Weapons Withdrawal: Not If, but How," in: M. Chalmers, A. Somerville (eds.), *If the Bombs Go: European Perspectives on NATO's Nuclear Debate*, RUSI Whitehall Report, 1-11, May 2011; L. Kulesa (ed.), *The Future of NATO's Deterrence and Defence Posture: Views from Central Europe*, PISM Report, December 2012.

commitment, especially if compounded with further reductions of American conventional forces in Europe.¹² The Polish experts have instead explored possible steps, including transparency and confidence-building measures, that might facilitate reciprocal reductions of Russian and NATO non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe.¹³

It is currently perceived that the Ukraine crisis and possible Russian non-compliance with the INF Treaty has strengthened the rationale

for NATO nuclear deterrence, including the sustained basing of U.S. weapons in Europe.¹⁴ In the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, some experts have even recommended a relocation of a portion of the NSNW stockpile to Poland in order to bolster the Alliance's deterrence against Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons.¹⁵ To others, though, such a step would be harmful for political and practical reasons and would not strengthen the credibility of the NATO deterrence.¹⁶

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT EFFORTS IN THE GLOBAL ARENA

Poland takes an active part in the NPT review process. As a member of the European Union, Poland's stance within the NPT review process is also represented in statements delivered on behalf of the whole EU.

In national statements delivered at the 2010 NPT Review Conference and at the meetings

of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Poland underscored its view that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing and focused on two main recommendations for strengthening the NPT regime. First, and in line with the discussions within NATO, Warsaw

¹²I. Liegis, L. Linkevicius, J. Onyszkiewicz, "Why Europe Still Needs Nuclear Deterrence," European Leadership Network, 21 May 2012, www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org; see also: B. Węglarczyk, "View from Poland: We need U.S. nuclear warheads in Europe," *European Disarmament*, 14 September 2011, europeandisarmament.wordpress.com.

¹³See, for example: P. Schulte, P.S. Hilde, K. Zysk, Ł. Kulesa, J. Durkalec, *The Warsaw Workshop: Prospects for Information-Sharing and Confidence-Building on Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe, Post-Conference Report*, a joint publication of the Polish Institute of International Affairs, the Nuclear Policy Program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Warsaw, April 2013; J. Durkalec (PISM), I. Kearns (ELN), Ł. Kulesa (PISM), *Starting the Process of Trust-Building in NATO–Russia Relations: The Arms Control Dimension*, PISM Report, October 2013; J. Durkalec, A. Zagorski, *Options for Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures Related to Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Cost-Benefit Matrix*, PISM–MEMO RAN Workshop Report, Polish Institute of International Affairs, July 2014.

¹⁴Ł. Kulesa, "As if Struck by Lightning? The Future of Nuclear Security and the Non-Proliferation System after Crimea," *PISM Bulletin*, no. 41 (636), 24 March 2014.

¹⁵J. Bartosiak, T. Szatkowski, "America needs Poland that is more self sufficient," National Centre for Strategic Studies, 15 May 2014, ncss.org.pl/en/news/america-needs-poland-that-is-more-self-sufficient.73.

¹⁶See: Ł. Kulesa, "Careful What You Wish For: Nuclear Reductions and Conventional Deterrence in Europe after Crimea," *PISM Strategic File*, no. 15 (51), August 2014; J. Durkalec, "Russia's Violation of the INF Treaty: Consequences for NATO," *PISM Bulletin*, no. 107 (702), 13 August 2014.

has made proposals for the global elimination of NSNWs and for the implementation of related transparency and confidence-building measures. Second, Poland has advocated universalisation of the IAEA Additional Protocol as a safeguard standard.¹⁷

Additionally, Poland has come forward with further proposals as a member of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI). NPDI states have issued—both through the NPT forum as well as in separate, ministerial meetings, which take place twice a year—a series of joint statements and working papers calling mainly for:

- Reductions of all categories of strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons;
- Moratorium on the development of new nuclear warheads;
- Increased transparency of nuclear arsenals and doctrines (regular reports, for example, on the numbers of deployed, non-deployed, reduced and dismantled warheads and delivery vehicles, as well as on the amount of fissile material produced for military purposes);
- Diminished role and significance of nuclear weapons in their Nuclear Weapon States' security strategies and military doctrines,

with an emphasis on the adoption of negative security assurances and on the “de-alerting” of nuclear weapons;

- Entry into force of the CTBT;
- Negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament;
- Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including in the Middle East a WMD-free zone;
- Education on disarmament, non-proliferation and humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapon use.¹⁸

Apart from activity with NPT, Warsaw is also a leading participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), since its announcement by U.S. President George W. Bush in Kraków, Poland, in March 2003. So far, the Polish side has led three multinational exercises: ground-interdiction exercise “Safe Borders” in Poland in 2004, ground-interdiction exercise “Bohemian Guards 05” in the Czech Republic in 2005 (co-led with the Czech government), and maritime and ground exercise “Amber Sunrise” in 2006, which was hosted on Polish, Danish, Swedish and Russian territories.¹⁹

Poland has hosted a series of other PSI-related events, including three out of four PSI high-level meetings, including the

¹⁷ *Ibidem*; also see: “Statement by H.E. Przemysław Grudziński, Permanent Representative of Republic of Poland to the United Nations Office and International Organizations in Vienna, Head of Polish Delegation,” Vienna, 30 April 2012.

¹⁸ NPDI statements and working papers are available at: “Non-Proliferation Treaty,” Reaching Critical Will, www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/npt; “Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/npdi/index.html. For summary of NPDI’s activity, see: G. Mukhatzhanova, W. Potter, “Coalitions to Watch at the 2015 NPT Review Conference,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, 24 February 2015, www.nti.org.

¹⁹ U.S. Department of State, “Calendar of events,” Proliferation Security Initiative, www.state.gov.

PSI Tenth Anniversary High-Level Political Meeting in Warsaw in 2013. Poland has also been a leading organiser of promotional meetings with current and potential regional participants: Meeting for Central and Eastern Europe in Warsaw in 2004, Meeting for the Black Sea region, in Kyiv in 2007, and Meeting for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Abu Dhabi in 2007. Furthermore, Poland hosted what has so far been the only Regional PSI Critical Capabilities and Practices Workshop, which took place in Warsaw in 2013, as well as two expert meetings: Regional Operational Experts Group Meeting in Sopot in 2009, and the Operational Experts Group Meeting in Warsaw in 2013.²⁰

In order to coordinate activities within the PSI framework, Poland created an inter-agency task force comprised of representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Economy (responsible for export licenses), Ministry of Justice and the Prosecutors' office, border guard, customs, and intelligence agencies.²¹

In 2010, the task force was transformed into the Inter-ministerial Committee for the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and became responsible for the creation of Polish policy regarding problems of WMD proliferation, the coordination of actions performed by the respective ministries and agencies, as well as analyses of WMD proliferation-related issues. The committee plays an important role in the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. Since 2013, Poland and Croatia have also been conducting peer reviews of the implementation of Resolution 1540 in both countries. The exchange and evaluation of specific national views and experiences has so far taken place during two visits by groups of national non-proliferation experts representing various ministries and agencies.²²

In addition, Poland joined the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction in 2003, making a collective contribution of about \$200 million (together with Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland).

²⁰ "Kraków Initiative–Proliferation Security Initiative," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, www.psi.mfa.gov.pl; J. Durkalec, "Proliferation Security Initiative (Kraków Initiative) at 10: Successes and Challenges," *PISM Bulletin*, no. 58 (511), 29 May 2013.

²¹ Ł. Kulesa, "Poland and the Proliferation Security Initiative," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, vol. 22, no. 1, March 2010, pp. 17–18.

²² "10th anniversary of Resolution 1540 against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction," Permanent Mission of Republic of Poland to the United Nations in New York, www.newyorkun.mfa.gov.pl.

NUCLEAR SECURITY

Poland ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 1983 and amendment to the convention in 2007. In 2009, Poland also ratified the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Additionally, Warsaw participates in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. The country has been taking part in the Nuclear Security Summits since 2010. Poland was ranked as 6th out of 25 countries with weapons-usable nuclear materials in 2014's NTI Nuclear Materials Security Index.

Currently, Poland operates only one active research reactor, Maria, at the National Centre for Nuclear Research in Świerk near Warsaw, while EWA, the second research reactor in Świerk, remains partially dismantled after ceasing operations in 1995 and decommissioning in 2002.²³ Both Cold War-era reactors were powered by Soviet- and later Russian-supplied highly enriched uranium (HEU). The Maria reactor has been converted to operate on low enriched

uranium (LEU) fuel as part of cooperation with the United States and Russia within the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) run by U.S. Department of Energy.²⁴

Since 2004, joint efforts of Poland, the United States, Russia and the IAEA through GTRI have also included security upgrades at the Świerk facility, as well as shipments of HEU fuel to Russia.²⁵ The remaining spent HEU is expected to be returned to Russia by 2016, when Poland is to become an HEU-free country.²⁶

Poland has announced plans to start a civil nuclear programme for energy supply purposes (the National Nuclear Power Programme, or NNPP).²⁷ The first of two planned Polish nuclear power plants awaits construction and is scheduled to begin operations in 2025, with the second in 2035.²⁸ Poland has vowed, in both the NPT and NSS forums, to implement NNPP to the highest standards of nuclear safety and security.²⁹

²³ "EWA Reactor," National Atomic Energy Agency, www.paa.gov.pl.

²⁴ "NNSA Helps Poland Convert Reactor, Remove Highly Enriched Uranium," National Nuclear Security Administration, 25 September 2012, nnsa.energy.gov; "Licence to Operate MARIA Research Reactor Renewed for 10 Years," National Centre for Nuclear Research, 9 April 2015, www.ncbj.gov.pl.

²⁵ J. Fox, "Polish Reactor Turns Over Nuclear Fuel," *Global Security Newswire*, 5 September 2007, www.nti.org/gsn.

²⁶ "Nuclear Security Summit 2014 National Progress Report: Poland," www.nss2014.com.

²⁷ See: A. Gawlikowska-Fyk, Z. Nowak, "Nuclear Energy in Poland," *PISM Report*, September 2014.

²⁸ Media sources have, however, reported in April 2015 that the program could face a two-year long delay. A. Barteczko, A. Koper, "Poland's Nuclear Project Pushed Back at Least Another Two Years," *Reuters*, 14 April 2015, www.reuters.com.

²⁹ See, e.g.: "Statement by H.E. Hanna Trojanowska, Government Commissioner for Nuclear Power, Ministry of Economy, Poland," New York, 13 May 2010; "Statement of Minister Radosław Sikorski on behalf of the Republic of Poland," The Hague, 24–25 March 2014.

As a transit country and border state of the European Union, Poland has recently and significantly improved its radiometric control system. After joining the U.S. Department of Energy's "Second Line of Defence" programme in 2009, substantial American assistance was delivered to Polish agencies and services, such as the police, border guard and Bureau of Counter-Terrorist Operations.³⁰ Assistance included mainly training, as well as the delivery and maintenance of fixed and mobile radiation detection equipment. Poland, with the support of the U.S. and IAEA, took further steps to improve its radiological detection capabilities during preparations for the 2012 UEFA European Football

Championships (Euro 2012), hosted jointly by Poland and Ukraine.³¹

So far, Poland is one of seven states that has issued a "Nuclear Security Summit Outreach Efforts" statement and it has hosted two regional meetings devoted to those efforts in order to promote the NSS goal of strengthening nuclear security culture through dialogue and cooperation between countries.³² In August 2010, Poland organised a seminar for Central and Eastern European states on the outcomes of the NSS, and in February 2012, Poland and Interpol jointly organised the Nuclear Security Summit Law Enforcement Counter-Nuclear Smuggling Conference.³³

MISSILE

MISSILE DEFENCE

Warsaw strongly supports the deployment of elements of the U.S. missile defence system in Europe (European Phased Adaptive Approach, or EPAA) as part of NATO's

ballistic missile defence (BMD) capability. By 2018, Poland is scheduled to host an Aegis Ashore installation with 24 American SM-3 Block IIA interceptors in Redzikowo, in the

³⁰ "Poland's accession to 'Second Line of Defence' Program of the U.S. Department of Energy," Ministry of the Interior of Poland, 6 January 2009, www.msw.gov.pl/en; "U.S. Support for Poland's Euro 2012 Security Efforts," U.S. Embassy in Poland, 20 July 2012, www.poland.usembassy.gov.

³¹ K. Kubiak, "A Little-Known Success Story: Implementation of the NSS Goals in Central Europe," *PISM Policy Paper*, no. 9 (92), May 2014, pp. 5–6.

³² See: "Joint Statement by the United States, Chile, Poland, Nigeria, Morocco, Thailand, and the Republic of Korea on the Nuclear Security Summit Outreach Efforts," The White House, 26 March 2012, www.whitehouse.gov.

³³ K. Kubiak, *op. cit.*, p. 7; see also: "International conference aims to boost cooperation in fight against nuclear smuggling," Interpol, 27 February 2012, www.interpol.int.

northern part of the country.³⁴ The purpose of the missiles is to protect Europe from limited ballistic attack from the Middle East. Initially, EPAA envisaged the deployment of additional, more sophisticated SM-3 Block IIB interceptors, that would have the potential to shoot down U.S.-bound ICBMs, no sooner than in 2020, also in Redzikowo. This phase, however, was cancelled in March 2013 due to financial and technical hurdles.³⁵

The Polish and American governments reportedly have held talks since 2002 regarding Polish participation in a missile defence project.³⁶ Formal bilateral negotiations on the possible deployment of interceptors on Polish soil started in 2007 at the request of the Bush administration.³⁷ From the very beginning, the idea of housing missile defence installations in Poland received firm support from the country's two main political parties—Civic Platform (PO) and Law and Justice (PiS). Under the agreement signed in August 2008, in 2011–2013 Poland was supposed to host 10 ground-based interceptors.³⁸ However, the plans were abandoned by the Obama

administration, which announced the change on 17 September 2009.³⁹

The new administration offered Poland cooperation within the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) framework. In July 2010, Polish consent to the American proposal resulted in amendments to the 2008 deal, which entered into force in its revised form in September 2011.⁴⁰

From Poland's perspective, American interceptors deployed on Polish territory would serve as a "visible assurance" measure and would establish a permanent U.S. military presence in Poland and in the CEE. Polish officials have also underscored that these installations would contribute to common Allied BMD capability by protecting Allies from upper-tier missile threats.⁴¹

Moreover, Poland expressed the need to develop a separate air defence system capable of intercepting lower-tier threats, such as planes or shorter-range ballistic and cruise missiles.

Currently, Poland has outdated, Soviet-built SA-3, SA-5 and SA-6 anti-aircraft missiles.

³⁴ J. Adamowski, T. Kington, "Building the Shield: European Nations Cooperate with US, NATO Allies on Missile Defense," *Defense News*, 26 November 2013, www.defensenews.com.

³⁵ "DOD News Briefing on Missile Defense from the Pentagon," 15 March 2013, Department of Defense, www.defense.gov; R. Oswald, "Next-Gen U.S. 'Antimissile' System Dropped for Domestic Reasons but Russia in the Mix: Ex-Envoy," *Global Security Newswire*, 18 March 2013, www.nti.org/gsn; see also: J. Durkalec, "Modifications of the U.S. Missile Defence Plans in Europe," *PISM Bulletin*, no. 27 (480), 18 March 2013.

³⁶ "U.S. considers Polish missile base," BBC, 17 November 2005, news.bbc.org.uk

³⁷ "Polish–U.S. missile defence negotiations", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.msz.gov.pl/en.

³⁸ "United States, Poland Sign Missile Interceptor Deal," *Global Security Newswire*, 20 August 2008, www.nti.org/gsn.

³⁹ The fact that the American government did not consult its decision with Polish officials and that the shift in policy was announced on the 70th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland caused a harsh reaction from Polish politicians. See: "U.S. Missile Defense Reversal Frustrates Polish Leaders," *Global Security Newswire*, 29 September 2009, www.nti.org/gsn.

⁴⁰ "Polish–U.S. missile...", *op. cit.*

⁴¹ R. Kupiecki, "Polish Perspectives on Missile Defense," Center for European Policy Analysis, 7 March 2013, www.cepa.org.

The development of a new national air and missile defence system was announced in 2012 and is scheduled to be completed by 2025. The new air-defence architecture will be composed of eight batteries of medium-range interceptors, code-named *Wista*, and two layers of shorter-range air defences. On 21 April 2015, Poland announced the choice of Patriot missiles for the *Wista* programme. The final agreement on the purchase of the

missiles, manufactured by the Raytheon company, is expected to be signed in 2016.⁴²

A modernised Polish air defence system will be connected to NATO's Ballistic Missile Defence architecture, responsible for the protection of NATO European territory, populations and forces.⁴³ Poland and the NATO Communications and Information (NCI) Agency signed an agreement on cooperation in that matter on 5 February 2015.⁴⁴

BALLISTIC AND CRUISE MISSILES

Warsaw is a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime and party to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. Poland does not currently possess, produce or host ballistic missiles on its territory.⁴⁵

The Polish arsenal of land-based cruise missiles comprises truck-mounted Naval Strike Missiles (NSM), capable of engaging sea and land targets at a range of up to 200 km.⁴⁶ The missiles are operated by the Naval Missile Unit, currently consisting of a

single squadron-sized force, which is set to have 50 NSMs by 2016. Additionally, in December 2014, Poland signed a deal to buy another 24 missiles for the second squadron, which are to be delivered by May 2018.⁴⁷

Poland also possesses ship-based anti-ship cruise missiles. These include Harpoon missiles carried by an Oliver Hazard Perry class frigate, and RBS-15 Mk3 missiles deployed on three Orkan-class fast attack craft.⁴⁸

⁴² M.A. Piotrowski, "Crossing the Vistula River: The Importance of the Air and Missile Defence of Poland," *PISM Bulletin*, no. 44 (776), 28 April 2015.

⁴³ R. Kupiecki, *op. cit.*

⁴⁴ "Poland and NCI Agency Intensify Cooperation on Missile Defence," NATO Communications and Information Agency, 2 February 2015, www.ncia.nato.int.

⁴⁵ Poland, however, possessed Soviet-built, nuclear capable, road-mobile, tactical ballistic missiles and rockets, delivered to Polish units during the Cold War. All of the Polish FROG-family of rockets and SS-1C SCUD B missiles were withdrawn from service by 2002, while the last of the SS-21 Scarab missiles were retired in 2005.

⁴⁶ See: "Naval Strike Missile (NSM) Coastal Defense System," Kongsberg, www.kongsberg.com.

⁴⁷ "Nowe 'polskie kły'. Uzbrajamy dywizjon rakietowy" [New "Polish Fangs". We are arming the missile squadron], *Polskie Radio*, 19 December 2014, www.polskieradio.pl.

⁴⁸ "The Military Balance 2015," The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 2015, p. 124.

At the end of 2012, the Polish Defence Ministry announced the intent to buy American-manufactured AGM-158A Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missiles (JASSM).⁴⁹ The U.S. Congress approved the sale of 40 missiles in October 2014, and the procurement agreement was signed on 11 December 2014.⁵⁰ JASSM missiles will be carried by Polish F-16 multi-role fighters, and will provide the planes with the ability to strike ground targets within a range of 370 km. Moreover, Poland expressed its interest to acquire the JASSM-ER variant with a range of almost 1000 km.⁵¹ Nonetheless, Warsaw

has not made an official request for such a purchase as of April 2015.

Furthermore, in November 2014, Poland announced its intention to buy submarine-launched cruise missiles capable of hitting land targets at ranges of up to 800 km.⁵² The missiles would be deployed on three submarines that Poland plans to acquire by 2023. Warsaw officially confirmed in March 2015 that it asked the U.S. about the possibility of the acquisition of Tomahawk missiles.⁵³ The other potential supplier is France, with its MdCN missiles.⁵⁴

CHEMICAL

Poland does not possess chemical weapons or pursue their development. Poland is a founding member of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Poland is also a member of the Australia Group (AG).

Warsaw's active stance regarding the OPCW mission is illustrated by the fact that Poland is the only country that annually submits

a draft resolution on the implementation of the CWC at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. Furthermore, Polish representatives have presided over OPCW's main political bodies, the Executive Council and the Conference of State Parties, and have taken part in the work of advisory organs such as the Scientific Advisory Board or the Advisory Body on Administrative and Financial Matters. A representative of Poland

⁴⁹ "Siemoniak o postępie ws. zakupu pocisków do F-16" ["Siemoniak on progress in purchase of missiles for F-16"], *Rzeczpospolita*, 18 April 2014.

⁵⁰ "Poland Signs the JASSM Contract," *Defence24*, 11 December 2014, www.defence24.com.

⁶¹ J. Siminski, "U.S. Air Force Has Approved Mass Production of the Stealthy JASSM Air-launched Cruise Missiles," *The Aviatonist*, 18 December 2014, <http://theaviatonist.com>.

⁵² "Cruise Missiles Indispensable For The Polish Submarines—Required Range: 800 km," *Defence24*, 6 November 2014, www.defence24.com.

⁵³ J. Adamowski, "Poland to Launch Sub Tender, Eyes Tomahawks," *Defense News*, 12 March 2015, www.defensenews.com.

⁵⁴ M.M. Sobczyk, "Poland Looking to Buy Cruise Missiles for Submarines," *The Wall Street Journal*, 12 March 2015, www.wsj.com.

also chaired the Third Review Conference of the Convention in 2013.⁵⁵

Poland and OPCW have jointly organised events, such as the 2000 *Alleged Use* exercise, aimed at training of international inspectors. In 2007, Poland and Netherlands organised a High Level Meeting to coincide with the 10th anniversary of the Convention in New York, then in 2012, Poland played host to the Eleventh Regional Meeting of National Authorities of State Parties in Eastern Europe, which took place in Warsaw. Additionally, in December 2013, the Polish government decided to donate €100,000 to the OPCW Trust Fund for the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons.⁵⁶

In order to bolster chemical weapons-related security cooperation between the public and private sectors, at both the national and international levels, the Polish government launched the International Centre for Chemical Safety and Security (ICCSS) in Tarnów in 2012. The centre's aim is to provide governments with analytical support and advice on chemical-weapons security issues, to organise workshops for chemists from industrial, scientific and academic fields, to provide training for small and medium-sized chemical companies, as well as to assist in drafting chemical anti-terrorism standards and to conduct educational and training activities with respect to various aspects of chemical safety.⁵⁷

BIOLOGICAL

Poland ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) on 25 January 1973. Poland does not possess or pursue the development of biological weapons.

Warsaw supports the creation of an international BTWC verification regime. Nevertheless, given the political difficulties in reaching that goal, Poland also endorses

measures that bolster BTWC implementation at the national level, such as stronger control of biological material transfers, improvements to systems guarding against the consequences of an intended or accidental spread of pathogens, or improved methods of combating bioterrorism.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ "Poland in the OPCW," Embassy of the Republic of Poland at The Hague, www.haga.msz.gov.pl; see also: S. Bocheński, "In the Shadow of Syria: Review of the Chemical Weapons Convention," *PISM Policy Paper*, no. 22 (70), July 2013.

⁵⁶ "Non-Proliferation and Disarmament," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, www.msz.gov.pl/en; "Poland contributed financially to the OPCW Trust Fund for destruction of Syrian chemical weapons," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, 16 December 2013, www.msz.gov.pl/en.

⁵⁷ See the website of the International Centre for Chemical Safety and Security: www.iccss.eu.

⁵⁸ "Rozbrojenie" [Disarmament], Permanent Representation of Poland to the UN Office in Geneva, www.genewa.msz.gov.pl.